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TRIMMING CONFRONTATION'S CLAWS:
NAVIGATING THE UNCERTAIN
JURISPRUDENTIAL TOPOGRAPHY
OF THE POST-MELENDEZ-DIAZ
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Oliver M Gold*
Decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that the Confrontation
Clause "comes to us on faded parchment." Nevertheless, more than
two hundred years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Court has
decreed not only what the clause means but also what constitutionally
required procedure it demands and which witnesses are subject to those
demands. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires a
state presenting a forensic lab report as evidence in a criminal trial to
make the analyst who prepared the report available for cross-
examination by the defense. This holding categorized scientific test
results as testimonial evidence subject to Confrontation Clause
demands because they are produced in order to prove a fact at a
criminal trial. This categorization has presented various problems for
prosecutions, especially when the analyst in a case is unavailable to
testify or difficult to locate. Even when the analyst is available, this new
understanding of the scope of the Confrontation Clause makes it much
more time-consuming and expensive for a state to fulfill its obligations
when prosecuting a criminal defendant. Essentially, the Court's holding
in Melendez-Diaz makes prosecuting cases more difficult, more
expensive, and, in some circumstances, impossible. The Court reached
this result by analyzing the Confrontation Clause through a strict
originalist lens and largely disregarding the practical problems that the
ruling would inevitably create. In the wake of this decision, states have
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wrestled with ways to preserve their ability to efficiently and
successfully prosecute criminal defendants. This Note analyzes the
constitutionality ofstates' efforts to alleviate this new burden, including
various forms of notice-and-demand statutes, surrogate testimony, and
live-video conferencing. Additionally, this Note contemplates and
promotes the possibility that the Court may narrow the scope of the
Confrontation Clause in future cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, eight-year-old Megan Ellison was raped and savagely
beaten; her throat was slit, and she was left to die in a downtown Los
Angeles dumpster.' When the girl's body was found, the responding
police officers collected a semen sample from her clothing, which
was analyzed by one of the department's forensic laboratory
analysts. However, despite the Los Angeles Police Department's best
efforts to find the perpetrator, a DNA match could not be identified
within the available records.2 The case eventually went cold and the
girl's killer remained at large for eighteen years, until a police
investigation of the disappearance of another young girl yielded a
suspect. Investigators collected samples of the man's DNA, which
linked him to the 1991 murder. Nearly two decades after their little
girl had been brutally taken from them, Megan's parents were finally
going to see the culprit face justice.
At trial, the state attempted to offer the DNA test results into
evidence. Defense counsel immediately objected on the ground that
the admission of the DNA test results without the ability to cross-
examine the forensic analyst involved in the testing violated his
client's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.' He requested the
opportunity to cross-examine the scientist who had analyzed the
semen sample found on the girl in 199 1. The trial court, bound by a
recent line of U.S. Supreme Court cases, sustained the objection and
ordered the prosecution to call the forensic analyst for cross-
examination. However, the analyst who initially collected the DNA
1. This is a fictional account created by the author.
2. DNA.gov, Statistics Behind a Match, http://www.dna.gov/statistics/statistics-otc/ (last
visited July 30, 2010) ("To find a [DNA] match, forensic analysts compare the genetic profile
obtained from crime scene evidence to the profile from a known individual (e.g., [a] suspect [or]
victim). If the DNA profiles from the evidentiary and known samples are the same at each locus
[the specific physical location of a gene on a chromosome], laboratory analysts can provide a
determination of the statistical significance of the evidence. In some cases, no conclusive
interpretation can be made. Typically there are three possible laboratory outcomes: (1) [i]f the
DNA profiles from the evidentiary and known samples are consistent at each locus, laboratory
analysts can interpret the finding as a 'match,' 'inclusion,' or 'failure to exclude'[;] (2) [i]f the
two profiles are not consistent at each locus, the finding can be interpreted as a 'nomnatch' or
'exclusion'[;] (3) [i]f there are insufficient data to support a conclusion, the finding is often
referred to as 'inconclusive."').
3. See infra note 6.
4. The Supreme Court has held that a witness will be considered "subject to cross-
examination" if the witness is "placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to
questions." United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561 (1988).
1434 [Vol. 43:1431
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sample eighteen years ago had since passed away, therefore
rendering her testimony an impossibility. Despite the fact that the
scientific evidence would prove that the defendant committed the
heinous crimes,' since it was impossible for the scientist to testify in
court, if no other evidence were available, the rapist-murderer would
remain free. This hypothetical illustrates one unfortunate
repercussion of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent paradigm shift
regarding its interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution reads, "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him."6
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,' the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires a
state presenting a forensic lab report as evidence in a criminal trial to
make the analyst who prepared the report available for cross-
examination by the defense.' This holding categorized scientific test
results as testimonial evidence subject to Confrontation Clause
demands since they are produced in order to prove a fact at a
criminal trial.' This categorization has presented various problems
for prosecutions, especially when the analyst in a case is unavailable
to testify or difficult to locate."o Even when the analyst is available,
this new understanding of the reach of the Confrontation Clause
makes it much more time-consuming and expensive for a state to
fulfill its obligations when prosecuting a criminal defendant."
5. The likelihood that any two individuals (except identical twins) will share the same
thirteen-locus DNA profile can be as low as one in one billion or greater. NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD CASES 6 (2002),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/194197.pdf.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The full text of the Sixth Amendment is:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
7. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
8. Id at 2532.
9. Id.
10. David G. Savage, Supreme Court Ruling Shakes Up Criminal Trials, L.A. TIMES, July
26, 2009.
11. See Jessica Fargen, DA: DNA Ruling 'Huge Issue', BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 2, 2009, at 7.
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Essentially, the Court's holding in Melendez-Diaz makes prosecuting
cases more difficult, expensive, and, in some circumstances,
impossible.12
This Note addresses the practical setbacks of the
Crawford/Melendez-Diaz line of cases and the cases' imposition on
states' efforts to prosecute criminal defendants. It argues that the
states should be able to respond to the added burden in prosecuting
cases imposed by the Crawford/Melendez-Diaz line of cases by
making certain statutory changes that mitigate the windfall to
defendants. This burden on state prosecutions may be addressed and
alleviated through: (1) legislating notice-and-demand statutes; (2)
allowing peer-review, surrogate, or video-conferencing testimony
under certain circumstances; and (3) narrowing the scope of
Crawford/Melendez-Diaz's reach in upcoming Confrontation Clause
cases. Part II will focus on the history and progression of the Court's
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence up to the present. Part III will
follow with a survey of the current state of the law and will introduce
some of the practical difficulties created by Melendez-Diaz. Part IV
will then examine some of the manners in which state courts and
legislatures have responded in the wake of Melendez-Diaz to deal
with those burdens. This part will scrutinize those measures in light
of the Court's language to assess whether they might pass
constitutional muster and will then explore which approaches are
most effective at tempering some of the harsh consequences of
Melendez-Diaz. It will also analyze the possibility that the Court, in
light of its recently changed chemistry, 3 may narrow the reach of the
Confrontation Clause in its upcoming decisions.14 Part V will justify
12. Furthermore, the Court's novel reinterpretation of the meaning and import of the
Confrontation Clause comes more than 200 years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Writing
for the Court in these Confrontation Clause cases, Justice Scalia adheres to a strict originalist
interpretation of the clause and its history in a way that comports with his own judicial beliefs,
whilst ignoring many of the practical complications it will create for state courts and
prosecutions.
13. Justice Souter, who retired last term, cast his vote along with the 5-4 majority in
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. Accordingly, his replacement, Justice Sotomayor, will likely
provide the swing vote in the Court's forthcoming Confrontation Clause cases.
14. Four days after deciding Melendez-Diaz, the Court granted certiorari in Briscoe v.
Virginia. Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009). Because the facts and issues in the two cases were
similar, many speculated that the decision to hear Briscoe would necessarily entail some
narrowing of Melendez-Diaz. See, e.g., Federal Evidence Blog, http://federalevidence.com/blog
(Jan. 8, 2010). Surprisingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia in a
[Vol. 43:14311436
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why these measures are desirable, both economically and to ensure
the greatest degree of justice. Finally, Part VI will provide a brief
summary and conclude.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE COURT'S
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Until relatively recently, the Confrontation Clause was seldom
litigated." Before 1965, the clause, as part of the Bill of Rights, only
restricted the federal government from introducing certain evidence
against a criminal defendant without providing him with an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witness; it did not
apply to the states." Because the Court controlled the way the clause
was employed in the federal courts, there was little occasion for the
Court to proffer any ruling on the scope of the right to confrontation.
In 1965, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Confrontation Clause was a fundamental right incorporated via the
Fourteenth Amendment and was thereby applicable to the states."
This meant that state criminal trials would now have to comport with
the strictures of their federal counterparts, specifically by ensuring a
criminal defendant his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation." In
the wake of this decision, states largely grappled with the ruling's
impact on state prosecutions henceforth and independently attempted
to define the circumstances that triggered a criminal defendant's
right to confrontation. 9 As a result, the Court was compelled to
clarify the reach and meaning of the clause.
In 1980, sensing the need for a rule to provide guidance to the
states,20 the Court developed a two-part test to define the
circumstances under which a state could offer statements against a
defendant without being required to make the declarant available for
per curiam decision and remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with
Melendez-Diaz just two weeks after oral argument was held. See Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct.
1316 (2010).
15. RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL
238 (1997).
16. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
17. Id. at 403.
18. See id.
19. See Miguel A. M6ndez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 571
(2004) (discussing the states' responses to Pointer v. Texas).
20. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980).
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cross-examination. In Ohio v. Roberts,2' the Court held that a
defendant's right to confrontation did not bar admission of an
unavailable witness's statement against the defendant if the statement
bore adequate "indicia of reliability," which could be established if
the evidence (1) fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, or (2)
bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 2  A line of cases
following this decision attempted to define the boundaries of the
Roberts test.23
The resultant test was, in practice, very similar to the application
of the hearsay rule and its exceptions. As law professor Miguel
Mdndez observed:
[T]he [pre-Crawford] confrontation analysis eventually
adopted by the Court dispensed with the cross-examination
of the hearsay declarant when the hearsay received against
the accused was offered under a "firmly rooted" exception
or, if offered under a novel exception, the prosecution took
the additional step of demonstrating the reliability of the
hearsay.24
Beginning with the late Rehnquist Court, a movement toward a
strict originalist interpretation and application of the Confrontation
Clause, largely spearheaded by Justice Antonin Scalia, led to a
considerable shift in the understanding of its meaning and
boundaries.2 5 In Crawford v. Washington,2 6 the Court held that a
witness's tape-recorded statements made during police interrogation
were testimonial.27 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, traced the
origins of the right to confrontation back to Roman times and
21. 448 U.S. 56.
22. Id. at 66.
23. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (holding that evidence is admissible if
embraced within such firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule as those for spontaneous
declarations and statements made for medical treatment); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990)
(limiting the evidence a trial court may consider when deciding whether evidence offered had
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness when it was not within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception).
24. Mdndez, supra note 19, at 575 (footnote omitted).
25. "Invoking the 'plain meaning' of the language in the clause and refusing to establish new
doctrine, Justice Scalia has written several important opinions about the clause's meaning."
BRISBIN, supra note 15, at 238; see Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009);
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
26. 541 U.S. 36.
27. Id. at 68-69.
1438 [Vol. 43:143 1
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presented a historical evolution of the right.28 In his view, the
primary aim of the Framers of the Bill of Rights with respect to the
Confrontation Clause was to eliminate the use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against an accused. The Court stated that
the Roberts test was "inherently, and therefore permanently,
unpredictable." 29 Justice Scalia wrote that it is both too broad (it
applies the same analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of ex
parte testimony, which leads to close scrutiny in instances where the
clause was not meant to apply) and too narrow (it allows ex parte
testimony to be admitted as long as it is deemed "reliable").30 Based
on this unpredictability, and the belief that the Roberts approach
strayed from the original understanding of the right to confrontation,
the Crawford Court overruled the Roberts test and introduced a new
approach."
Channeling the Framers' understanding, the Court affirmed that
"[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [may be]
admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine."32 The Court
declined the opportunity to provide a definition of what constitutes a
testimonial statement, and it has not provided a comprehensive
definition to date." This has naturally led to litigation, as states and
defendants struggle to discern whether evidence being offered
against a defendant is testimonial, and therefore subject to
confrontation demands, or not testimonial, where the procedure to
follow is less clear.34
28. Id. at 43-50.
29. Id. at 68 n.10.
30. Id at 60.
31. Id. at 68.
32. Id. at 59.
33. The Court stated:
We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of
"testimonial."..... [I]t applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the
modem practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause
was directed.
Id at 68 (footnote omitted).
34. In spite of the fact that the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements
has not been plainly defined, it seems as the latter category of statements need only to meet the
demands of the Roberts test. See id ("Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay
Summer 2010] 1439
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In Davis v. Washington,3 5 two years after the Crawford decision,
the Court again left the opportunity to spell out a comprehensive
definition of "testimonial" for another day. Instead, it focused on the
particular circumstances before it, and accordingly narrowed the
universe of what was considered to be a testimonial statement. 36
Davis held that while a recorded 911 call made by an assault victim
during the assault was not testimonial, statements made by an assault
victim to the police shortly after the crime were testimonial.3 ' The
Court reasoned that a statement is not testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that it was made with the primary
purpose of enabling law enforcement personnel to meet an ongoing
emergency."
Alternatively, it held that a statement is testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the statement was made in order to prove past
events relevant to a later criminal prosecution.39 With the somewhat
nebulous guidelines from Crawford and Davis in place, the stage was
set for the Court to determine whether the results of a forensic lab
analysis constitute testimonial hearsay, thus rendering their source
subject to the conditions of the Confrontation Clause. With Justice
Scalia again at the helm, the Court last year decided Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts.40
In Melendez-Diaz, the defendant objected, on confrontation
grounds, to the admission of lab certificates that stated that the
substance found in baggies on the defendant's person at the time of
his arrest was cocaine.4 1 The certificates of analysis showed the
results of the forensic analysis performed on the substance, reported
the weight of the seized bags, and stated that the substance was
law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.").
35. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
36. Id. at 822.
37. Id. at 829-30.
38. Id at 828.
39. Id. at 829.
40. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
41. Id. at 2531.
1440 [Vol. 43:1431
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found to contain cocaine.42 The certificates were also sworn to before
a notary public by the analysts, as required by Massachusetts law.43
The analysis employed by Justice Scalia in this case was
exceptionally methodical. He first determined that the documents at
issue fit within his chosen definition of an "affidavit."" Next, he
pointed to language from Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in
White v. Illinois45-subsequently relied upon in Crawford-which
stated that "[t]he Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial
statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions."46
Since there was little doubt, as far as the Court was concerned,
that the certificates at issue were affidavits, they fell within this "core
class of testimonial statements" and therefore required the analyst to
be called for cross-examination per the Confrontation Clause.4 7
Moreover, because the certificates were unquestionably prepared to
prove a fact at trial-that the substance in the baggies contained
cocaine-the Court determined that they were functionally
equivalent to live, in-court testimony.48 Citing his own reasoning
from Davis, Justice Scalia maintained that the certificates do
"precisely what a witness does on direct examination" and are
therefore inherently testimonial.49 Additionally, since the analysts
provided this evidence in order to prove a fact necessary for the
defendant's conviction, they qualified as witnesses against him."o
Thus, the admission of the certificates in Melendez-Diaz was held to
violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him."
42. Id.
43. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 13 (2008).
44. "Declaration[s] of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer
authorized to administer oaths." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (8th ed. 2004).
45. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
46. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 365).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
50. Id
51. Id.
Sumimer 2010] 1441
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III. PROBLEMS CREATED BY EXISTING LAW
The Melendez-Diaz Court wrote that the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause may not be relaxed because they make the
prosecution's task burdensome.52 Despite this seemingly severe
decree, state courts and legislatures have responded to Melendez-
Diaz with an array of statutes and rulings aimed precisely at
mitigating the increased burden on prosecutors." By restricting the
admissibility of certified laboratory reports-as they are within the
core class of testimonial statements-the Melendez-Diaz reasoning
implicates several practical difficulties and seems to cast a much
broader net than the Court may have intended.
First, consider the effect of this ruling on instances where the
applicable forensic analyst is unavailable to testify. For example, as
in the hypothetical that introduced this Note, a cold case could have
been solved using DNA evidence, except that the analyst who
collected and analyzed the DNA sample is deceased or no longer
available.54 Now that forensic reports fall within the purview of the
Crawford analysis, if the analyst is unavailable to testify, and the
defendant did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine him, the
analyst's test results or report will not be admissible. Where an
analyst has relocated or is otherwise geographically removed from
the location of the trial, the new demands will, at a minimum, force
prosecutions to incur substantial financial burdens in order to
accommodate the travel necessities of these witnesses.5
52. Id. at 2540.
53. See, e.g., H.D. 5007, 2009 Leg., Ist Spec. Sess. (Va. 2009); S. 252, 2009 Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009).
54. As recently as this past term, the Court has explicitly recognized the import of DNA
testing. Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
Modem DNA testing can provide powerful new evidence unlike anything known
before. Since its first use in criminal investigations in the mid-1980s, there have been
several major advances in DNA technology, culminating in STR [Short tandem repeat]
technology. It is now often possible to determine whether a biological tissue matches a
suspect with near certainty. While of course many criminal trials proceed without any
forensic and scientific testing at all, there is no technology comparable to DNA testing
for matching tissues when such evidence is at issue.
Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009).
55. In July 2009, a Massachusetts judge ruled in response to a Melendez-Diaz motion that
she would bar crucial DNA evidence in a child rape case unless the analyst who performed the
DNA analysis were made available for cross-examination. Another senior criminalist at the
Boston Police Department crime lab who had not analyzed the evidence, but had reviewed it, was
prepared to testify that there was a one in a quintillion chance that the DNA found on the girl's
underwear did not belong to the defendant. The District Attorney's office paid $1,000 for a last
[Vol. 43:14311442
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Additionally, by the letter of Melendez-Diaz, in instances where an
analyst is deceased and the defendant had no prior opportunity for
cross-examination, the court should exclude the pertinent evidence.
If this reasoning is applied to the aforementioned cold-case
hypothetical, the outcome is morally repulsive." Allowing a serial
rapist to remain free on an unlucky technicality, premised on a self-
entitled and originalist view of the Confrontation Clause, which
ignores that the Framers had no possible foresight of the
technological and scientific advances that could establish a
criminal's guilt in this day and age, seems excessive and ironically
novel." That it runs counter to decades of precedent," during which
time the criminal justice system established certain expectations and
practices that are now undermined, is an effective ambush on
prosecutions. In light of the fact that the Melendez-Diaz ruling is so
recent, it largely remains to be seen how stringently the confrontation
requirement will be enforced in situations like this one.
The Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner in
Melendez-Diaz argued, and Scalia agreed, that the burdens on states
would be slight if the case were decided as it was because
"stipulations, notice-and-demand statutes, clever courtroom
scheduling, video testimony, and (in some narrow circumstances)
surrogate testimony [would] all reduce the impact of requiring cross-
examination for forensic reports."60 In the majority opinion, Scalia
minute flight and a hotel room for the former Boston police DNA expert so that she could testify
in the trial. Fargen, supra note 11.
56. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
57. "When television news and newspaper headlines spotlight the release of someone
accused of a particularly gruesome crime because of a 'legal loophole,' the public points its finger
at the law and legal system. . . . Unpopular results like these inflame public opinion, skew the
image of lawyers and the legal system and actually endanger the rule of law." Eugene C. Thomas,
The Challenge of Public Education, 69 A.B.A. J. 1932, 1932 (1983) (discussing ways to improve
public opinion of the legal system).
58. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARv. L. REv. 885 (1985) (concluding that modem resort to the "intent of the framers" to
interpret the constitution was not the framers' expectation and that they did not consider such an
interpretive strategy to be appropriate).
59. For the twenty-four years preceding Crawford, state legislatures and courts were able to
structure prosecutions and admission of scientific evidence as they saw fit, provided that they met
the requirements of the Roberts test.
60. David Mansfield, Comment, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Laboratory Testing and
the Confrontation Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 161, 172 (2008)
(distilling the arguments contained within the Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support
1443Summer 2010]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
wrote that proof "that the sky will not fall after today's decision is
that it has not done so already."" He referred to the fact that several
states had already adopted the Confrontation Clause requirements
made obligatory by Melendez-Diaz prior to its holding, and that
those states had not been substantially impaired by the repercussions
of those laws.62 After proposing several ways in which courts might
be able to mitigate the onerous consequences of Melendez-Diaz,
Amici offered the following caveat: "None of this is to say that these
alternatives obviously pass constitutional muster."63 Indeed, although
it is understood that courts have inherent authority to control their
dockets and the manner in which they dispose of cases,' the question
of whether or not they will be permitted to utilize these particular
types of measures to respond to Melendez-Diaz is unclear.
However, states have already begun to feel the effects of the
Melendez-Diaz decision.65 Forensic labs' workloads have noticeably
spiked and certain states have been having problems producing
analysts at trial in the wake of Melendez-Diaz's increased demands.66
States are making efforts to temper the strain on prosecutions
through statutory amendments;" however, much like the constraints
defining testimonial hearsay, the states lack guidance on what terms
make these statutes constitutionally acceptable. Scalia writes that
notice-and-demand statutes "[i]n their simplest form" are
of Petitioner, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (No. 07-591), 2008 WL
2521264).
61. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540.
62. Id. at 2540-41. However, in Texas, a state that had previously adopted notice-and-
demand procedures, fifty-five forensic chemists in Department of Public Safety crime
laboratories examined evidence in a total of over 50,000 drug cases in 2004 (accounting for the
majority of cases examined in the department's crime labs). Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Forensic
Testing Servs., Drug Analysis Section, http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/CrimeLaboratory/Drugs.htm
(last visited July 30, 2010). This is an average of over 900 cases per analyst each year.
63. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 60, at 19.
64. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.
626, 630-31 (1962).
65. See Robert McCartney, A Valid Legal Theory That Crumbles with Each DUI Arrest,
WASH. POST, July 23, 2009, at B 1.
66. In Virginia, analysts in the drug section of the forensic department spent 369 hours in
court in July 2009, compared with only 230 hours in the previous eleven months. The number of
subpoenas the department received jumped from 144 in the week before the opinion came down
to more than 400 in most of the following weeks. Alan Cooper, Virginia General Assembly: The
Fix Is In: Legislature Passes Remedy for Melendez, VA. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 24, 2009.
67. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187 (2006) amended by 2009 Va. Acts 1st Spec. Sess.
Chs. 1, 4.
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constitutional because they shift no burden to the defendant; they
simply govern the time within which he must raise his Confrontation
Clause objection,6 and "[s]tates are free to adopt procedural rules
governing objections.""9 Essentially, the Court is saying that as long
as the defendant is given a reasonable amount of time in which to
object before trial, and the witness will appear as the prosecution's
witness, states may adopt notice-and-demand statutes to ease the
burden on prosecutions and not have to produce a witness in every
case.
However, there is an obvious conflict that follows from this
proposition: if a defendant is given notice that a lab result is to be
admitted, but the scientist who performed the test is deceased or
unavailable, the defense will object as a matter of strategy. Scalia's
historical explanation of the purpose of the Confrontation Clause-to
prevent prosecutions from being unfairly predicated on ex parte
statements to the disadvantage of the defendant"--does not comport
with the practical consequences of Melendez-Diaz's rule. Instead, as
a consequence of Melendez-Diaz, the defendant is provided with an
automatic default. If he objects and the state cannot produce the
witness, the evidence will not get admitted and the defendant could
elude conviction on a novel technicality. Although some courts have
allowed surrogate witnesses to testify when the original analyst is
unavailable," it remains to be definitively determined whether or not
this approach comports with the Court's requirements from
Crawford and Melendez-Diaz.n
In some states, prosecutors have relied on the state's version of
the Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) ("Rule 803(6)"), which provides
68. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009).
69. Id.; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977) (holding that a Florida law
did, consistently with the Constitution, require that respondent's confession be challenged at trial
or not at all).
70. "[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law
mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against
the accused." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
71. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 537 F.3d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 2378 (2009) (deciding pre-Melendez-Diaz that the characterization of forensic certificates as
non-testimonial was not in clear violation of law, and thus allowing a surrogate to testify was
acceptable); United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding the data regarding
DNA evidence is not testimonial); People v. Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 413 (Ct. App.
2009) (relying on Richardson to allow surrogate testimony); State v. Crager, 116 Ohio St. 3d 369,
2007-Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745, at 1 79.
72. This topic will be explored in Section IV.B, infra.
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a hearsay exception for business records for the admission of lab
reports." The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that a
defendant's confrontation right is not violated by the admission of
the results of a blood alcohol test by way of the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.74 Like the Virginia law at issue in
Briscoe v. Virginia," Pennsylvania's Rule of Evidence 803(6) places
the burden on an opposing party to show that the lab report is
untrustworthy and not entitled to admission as a business record. 6
However, the Court made clear in Melendez-Diaz that forensic lab
reports do not fall within the business records hearsay exception.
Consider again the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note, in
which a crime occurs and the police collect forensic evidence. A lab
analyst then tests the evidence and gets a DNA profile, and eighteen
years later, the defendant is apprehended. Unfortunately, by this time
the lab analyst is dead. Practically speaking, another scientist can
retest the evidence, assuming the samples have been adequately
preserved. However, whether this scenario-introducing the physical
evidence when none of the individuals who collected it are still
available to testify-would be acceptable under Melendez-Diaz is
unknown.
Justice Scalia limited the holding in Melendez-Diaz: "[W]e do
not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be
relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the
sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as
part of the prosecution's case."" But arguably, cross-examination of
the individuals who collected the evidence is even more important
73. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a case deciding the admissibility of a lab report,
held that a "state police lab chemist has no interest in the outcome of a trial and is employed
specifically to determine whether a controlled substance is present. . . . The chemist is a
professional, a scientist who is employed to be neutral and objective; thus, the potential for bias is
very small." Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261, 1268 (Pa. 2007).
74. Commonwealth v. Kravontka, 558 A.2d 865, 871 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
75. Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008), vacated sub non. Briscoe v.
Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010); see infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
76. PA. R. EVID. 803(6).
77. "[T]he affidavits do not qualify as traditional official or business records, and even if
they did, their authors would be subject to confrontation nonetheless." Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2009).
78. Id. at 2532 n. 1. Justice Scalia goes on to state that not everyone who laid hands on the
evidence must be called. "It is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of custody
are so crucial as to require evidence; but what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant
objects) be introduced live." Id
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than that of those who tested it, given that sloppy collection of
evidence may lead to tampering or contamination.7 9 One need only
think back to the O.J. Simpson murder case to be reminded of this
point." It is imbalanced to simply categorize those who collected the
evidence as non-testimonial witnesses because they collected the
evidence, rather than evaluated it.
This exemplifies another troubling implication, created by
Crawford but certainly perpetuated by Melendez-Diaz, which is that
there is great uncertainty as to when and how to apply the
Confrontation Clause demands." The analysis is largely
unpredictable at this point because what constitutes testimonial
evidence remains undefined by the Court. In Crawford, the Court
concluded that the term "testimonial evidence" should "appl[y] at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations."82 Melendez-
Diaz did not provide further guidance on the meaning of
"testimonial" statements since the Court concluded that the
certificates of analysis at issue were affidavits, and therefore within
the "core class of testimonial statements."8 3 The edges of what may
be identified as a "testimonial" statement remain semi-fluid. Indeed,
as one commentator noted, "Melendez-Diaz is a criminal case, but
the justice's language is broad enough that a civil practitioner can
invoke it to argue persuasively that an expert report prepared with a
view to litigation ought not to qualify as either a business entry or an
official record."1 84
79. See, e.g., JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND
GENETICS OF STR MARKERS 36 (2d ed. 2005).
80. Responding to presumably damning DNA evidence in that case, the defense "mounted
[a] vigorous counterattack, alleging samples were sloppily collected and poorly handled,
rendering DNA results unreliable." It also "raised [the] possibility that [the] blood was planted by
someone who took it from a police crime lab vial that contained Simpson's blood and a blood
preservative." List of the Evidence in the O.1 Simpson Double-Murder Trial, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct.
18, 1996.
81. See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing the Supreme
Court's failure to define the parameters of testimonial hearsay in Crawford as producing a
"miasma of uncertainty"). Melendez-Diaz largely left this vagueness unresolved.
82. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
83. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
84. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Ruling on Lab Reports Has Broad Implications: Decision That
They Are Testimonial and That Analysts Should Be Cross-Examined Is Relevant to Civil Cases,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 7, 2009, at 12.
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Ohio v. Roberts was overruled because its test was arbitrary and
difficult to apply." But if the Roberts test was arbitrary in its
assignment of reliability, then it could be said that the Crawford test
is arbitrary as to what is deemed testimonial. The subjective decision
remains in the hands of the fact finder; only the subject of arbitrary
decision-making has been shifted, from deciding whether evidence is
reliable to discerning whether it is testimonial.
The ambiguities and practical burdens created and compounded
by Melendez-Diaz may be even more perplexing than initially
thought because the makeup of the Court has since changed. Lower
courts are currently waiting on further guidance from the Court with
respect to what comprises testimonial evidence, as well as what
measures they may exercise and uphold when problems arise in cases
with a Confrontation Clause issue." Scalia's tenuous majority in
Melendez-Diaz" may have dissipated with Justice Sotomayor's
appointment, although the Briscoe decision does not bode well for
those expectant of this result. The Court's direction and thrust, in its
upcoming Confrontation Clause cases, therefore, is unpredictable
and perhaps in another state of flux.
IV. DIscusSION
The burdens Melendez-Diaz imposed on state prosecutions,
while especially challenging during these dismal economic times
when state coffers are wanting, may be addressed and mitigated
through the following approaches: (1) legislating notice-and-demand
statutes; (2) allowing peer-review, surrogate, or live-video testimony
under certain defined circumstances; and (3) narrowing the scope of
Crawford/Melendez-Diaz's reach both by lower courts through
clever interpretation of those cases, and by the Supreme Court in
upcoming Confrontation Clause cases.
85. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
86. See, e.g., People v. Bradley, No. B202011, 2009 Cal. LEXIS 9889 (Cal. Sept. 17, 2009)
(remanding the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider
the cause in light of Melendez-Diaz and the recent per curiam decision by the United States
Supreme Court in Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010)).
87. Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice
Thomas, however, wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he distanced himself from
Justice Scalia's reasoning, and Justice Souter has since retired and has been replaced by Justice
Sotomayor, a former New York County Assistant District Attorney. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at
2530.
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A. Notice-and-Demand and Burden-Shifting Statutes
In response to Melendez-Diaz, several state trial and appellate
courts have made attempts to skirt the requirements it imposes.
Briscoe v. Virginia, a case the Court granted certiorari to only four
days after Melendez-Diaz was decided," addressed whether a state
may avoid violating the Confrontation Clause by allowing a
defendant the right to call the analyst as his own witness rather than
be able to cross-examine him, essentially shifting the burden of
producing the witness to the defendant." The Virginia law at issue in
Briscoe allows a defendant to call a lab analyst as a defense
witness.9 0 The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that since the
defendants failed to utilize the defense-subpoena procedure provided
in the statute, they waived any other challenges under the
Confrontation Clause to the admissibility of the analyst's
certificates." States are split as to whether this type of burden-
shifting statute satisfies the Confrontation Clause.92
In Melendez-Diaz, Justice Scalia attempted to refute the
concerns of Justice Kennedy and the rest of the dissenting justices,
stating that generally, notice-and-demand statutes do not violate a
88. The petition for certiorari was granted on June 29, 2009. Magruder v. Commonwealth,
657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009).
Melendez-Diaz was decided on June 25, 2009. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2527.
89. As already discussed, the Court in Melendez-Diaz noted that notice-and-demand statutes
generally do not violate the Confrontation Clause: they do not shift any burden to the defendant to
subpoena the witness, but rather only govern the time within which a defendant must assert his
right to confrontation; furthermore, states are free to adopt procedural rules governing objections.
As will be seen, there is more than one flavor of what the Court refers to as notice-and-demand
statutes. By this statement, the Court ostensibly gave credence to the idea that no notice-and-
demand statute will violate the Confrontation Clause, but the fact that it granted certiorari to
Briscoe four days after it decided Melendez-Diaz suggests otherwise. The fact that the Virginia
law in Briscoe requires the defendant to call the analyst as a defense witness is what may pose a
problem. The timing and strategy of calling this witness is what was at issue in Briscoe and what
may make the law violative of the Confrontation Clause.
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1(E) (2009).
91. Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113, 125-26 (Va. 2008).
92. Compare State v. Campbell, 2006 ND 168, 719 N.W.2d 374, cert. denied 549 U.S. 1080
(2007) (holding that a defendant's failure to avail himself of the opportunity to confront the
analyst waived any potential Confrontation Clause violation), State v. Hughes, 713 S.W.2d 58, 62
(Tenn. 1986) (same), and State v. Smith, 323 S.E.2d 316, 328 (N.C. 1984) (holding that a statute
permitting the use of a chemical analyst's affidavit, in lieu of the analyst's live appearance, did
not constitute a Confrontation Clause violation), with State v. Belvin, 986 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 2008)
(holding that a breath-test affidavit prepared by a non-testifying technician constituted testimonial
hearsay, and its admission absent the defendant's prior opportunity to cross-examine the
technician violated the defendant's right to confrontation).
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defendant's right to confrontation since they do not shift any burden,
but merely govern the time within which a defendant must assert his
right to confrontation. This begs the question of what happens when
notice-and-demand statutes either undoubtedly or even possibly shift
the burden of producing a witness to the defense? The limits are
unknown as to how restrictive a notice law may be so that
prosecutors can bypass the burden of calling a witness if the
defendant does not satisfy its requirements.94
To distinguish the defining features of these types of notice
statutes, in an attempt to clarify this question, the Note adopts the
naming conventions presented by scholar Pamela R. Metzger," who
characterized these "ipse dixit statutes" as one of four types: notice-
93. To address the concerns of the dissent in Melendez-Diaz, Justice Scalia wrote:
In their simplest form, notice-and-demand statutes require the prosecution to provide
notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst's report as evidence at trial, after
which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to the admission
of the evidence absent the analyst's appearance live at trial.
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-154.1 (2006); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.41, § 4 (Vernon 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51(C) (West
2006).
94. The Court, along with counsel for the petitioner touched on this question during oral
argument in Melendez-Diaz:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: But you would say that what they call the notice-and-demand
type statute, that that's all right?
MR. FISHER: There is a variety of notice-and-demand type statutes, Justice Ginsburg,
and I think the law professors' brief lays it out the best of what we have before you.
We agree with the Solicitor General that a plain notice-and-demand statute that
requires the defense to do nothing more than assert his right in advance of trial to have
the prosecution put a live witness on the stand would be constitutional, I think, under
this Court's jurisprudence. Under the Compulsory Process Clause, under the jury right,
there are plenty of constitutional rights that, with fair notice, a Defendant can be
required to assert in advance of trial.
Now, there are other types of statutes that other States call "notice and demand" that
require something more of the defendant, whether it be that the defendant himself call
the witness, whether it be the defendant himself make some kind of good faith or prima
facie showing in order to have the prosecution call the witness. Those types of statutes,
I think this Court, to the extent in this opinion it would mention notice-and-demand
statutes, it would want to be careful to leave for another day, because, again, we would
agree with the Solicitor General that those would raise more difficult constitutional
questions.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009)
(No. 07-591).
95. Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School.
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and-demand, notice-and-demand-plus, anticipatory demand, or
defense subpoena procedures."
Under a simple notice-and-demand statute, a state must give
timely notice to a defendant, before trial, that it intends to rely on
certain forensic evidence.97 It may also have to provide the defense
with a copy of the certificate to be admitted.98 The defendant must
then timely object and demand that the prosecution produce the
forensic witness at trial.99 This demand does not need to include any
substantive allegations or specific fact-based objections.' In other
words, the defendant need only assert that he objects to the
admission of the evidence without accompanying testimony from the
analyst. Failure by the defendant to make a demand is considered a
waiver of the defendant's objection to the hearsay and to whatever its
statutory consequences, as they are defined by the state, may be.o0
Notice-and-demand-plus statutes generally utilize the same
procedure as the notice-and-demand varietyl02 but also impose
substantive requirements on the defendant's demand.' Examples of
this added element include requiring the defendant to show cause for
wanting to confront the witness, 04 requiring demonstration of a good
faith basis for challenging the forensic conclusions,0o and requiring
defense counsel to swear under oath that she intends to cross-
examine the analyst at trial.0 6 After the defendant enters his
substantive objection, the court determines whether the defense is
96. Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 481-84 (2006)
(discussing the characteristics and distinctions of the different categories of these statutes). Ipse
dixit means "he himself said it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (9th ed. 2009).
97. E.g., MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-306(b)(1)(ii) (West 2002) ("[I]f the State
decides to offer the test results without [live testimony], it shall, at least 30 days before trial,
notify the defendant . . . .").
98. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2167(2) (2008) (requiring the prosecutor to give the
defense a copy of the forensic report).
99. Timeliness may be defined by individual state statutes. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4332(a)(1) (2009) (defining timeliness as a minimum of five days before the beginning of the
trial).
100. Metzger, supra note 96, at 482.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.084(d) (2006).
105. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-35-31 1(c)(2) (2006).
106. ALA. CODE § 12-21-302(b) (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:501(B)(2) (2005).
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justified in demanding the analyst's appearance."' Although the
defendant does not have the burden of actually producing the
witness, common sense tells us that these types of laws clearly
impose some burden on the defendant. At what point this burden
crosses the line and becomes unconstitutional is the question that is
currently of the utmost interest.
Under an anticipatory demand statute, a state has no obligation
to notify the defendant that it intends to rely on a forensic report in
lieu of live, in-court testimony."os Nevertheless, the defendant must
make a timely pretrial demand that the State produce the analyst to
be cross-examined or he is deemed to have waived any objection to
the report.'09 Some anticipatory demand statutes also require defense
counsel to give substantive reasons for objecting to the admission of
the evidence."0
On its face, a provision like this seems to conflict with the new
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause: a defendant would need
to be able to predict the future to know what the evidence will say so
that he may put forward a proper reason to object. Even if the
defendant did have this foresight, such a provision could still raise
Fifth Amendment implications."' However, "[tihe defendant's
107. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-302(b) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.315 (2006).
108. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-313 (2006); FLA. STAT. §§ 316.1934, 327.354
(2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-2745 (2002); IOWA CODE § 691.2 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-2902a (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.010 (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 1112 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2431 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22C,
§§ 39, 41 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24(1)(e) (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90B,
§ 8(a)(2)(a) (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47A (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 11, § 13
(2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625(1)(a) (2006); MINN. STAT. § 634.16 (2006); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 577.037 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1439 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 50.315, 50.320
(2006); N.M. STAT. §§ 66-8-110, 66-13-11 (2006); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1195 (McKinney
1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518, 4520 (McKinney 2007); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.30
(McKinney 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03.1-37, 39-20-07 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.235
(2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-3-19 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-28-122, 40-35-311, 55-
10-407 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-515 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-10-503 (2009);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1202, 1203 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4816 (2009); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 19.2-187.01, 19.2-187.2 (2006).
109. Metzger, supra note 96, at 483.
110. Id. at 484.
111. Imagine that a defendant in a murder prosecution objects to the admission of evidence
that the defendant's DNA matches DNA found on a dead eight-year-old girl's underwear. By
justifying his objection by saying that he may have had sexual intercourse with the girl but did
not kill her, he is forced to concede his guilt in the rape to avoid conviction for the murder. The
defendant is effectively compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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proper invocation of discovery rules may alleviate the [predicament].
Most states require that, upon request, the prosecution disclose to the
defense any expert statements or reports that it plans to introduce at
trial."ll2 This would seem to lessen the burden on the defendant;
however, Justice Scalia indicated in Melendez-Diaz that the simple
notice-and-demand statutes were constitutionally acceptable because
they shifted no burden whatsoever.'13
It seems that requiring the State to give a defendant notice that it
intends to introduce forensic evidence is a reasonable minimum
requirement. After all, forensic evidence is not introduced in a
criminal prosecution to surprise an unsuspecting defendant with
damning evidence that he will be unable to defend against, thereby
possibly leading to undue prejudice and erroneous conviction.
Rather, a state's goal is to prosecute criminal defendants by
presenting evidence in a way that is fair to both sides and is
consistent with the Constitution and state law.114
The fourth category of statutes categorized under the larger
notice-and-demand umbrella is defense subpoena provisions. In these
situations, the defense must subpoena the forensic analyst to appear
and testify rather than demand that the prosecution call a witness to
be cross-examined."' Some states statutorily prescribe that the
defense may subpoena the analyst, who will then be called during the
State's case-in-chief."' In the absence of such provisions, however,
the defense may call the witness to testify as part of the defendant's
case-in-chief."' This is the type of statute at issue in Briscoe.
The Melendez-Diaz majority held that the power conferred by
defense subpoena statutes to subpoena analysts is no substitute for
112. Metzger, supra note 96, at 484 n.32.
113. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009).
114. Bennett v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 303, 311 (Va. 1988) ("The aim of trials is to find
the truth. Uncovering the truth is the paramount goal of the adversary system. All the rules of
decorum, ethics, and procedure are meant to aid the truth-finding process. Ambush, trickery,
stealth, gamesmanship, one-upmanship, [and] surprise have no legitimate role to play in a
properly conducted trial. This is so whether the gamesman is the defendant or the
Commonwealth.").
115. Metzger, supra note 96, at 484.
116. Id.
117. The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment reads as follows: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Criminal defendants are guaranteed
this right regardless of any statutory scheme.
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confrontation: such power is of no use to a defendant when the
witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear."' Scalia reasons
that "fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on
the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring
those adverse witnesses into court."" 9
Similarly, petitioners in Briscoe put forth a textual argument that
the use of the passive voice in the Confrontation Clause-"the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him"' 2 0 - "imposes a
burden of production on the prosecution, not on the defense." 2'
Essentially, one could imagine that the Court has provided us with
two markers on a measuring cup. The lower line, or floor,
corresponds to a state's ability to enact statutes that govern the time
in which a defendant must respond to notification that a lab report
will be presented as evidence against him provided that the
prosecution retains the burden of calling the witness. The upper line,
or ceiling, represents the state's inability to bypass Confrontation
Clause procedure by forcing the defendant to subpoena the analyst as
his own witness. What exists between those two lines is what is of
interest to the states.
The sentiments of state legislatures are apparent from the
statutes and discovery rules that have been passed post-Melendez-
Diaz. Virginia House Bill 5007, passed in August of 2009 in
response to Melendez-Diaz, modified the procedure at issue in
Briscoe.122 Most importantly, it now requires the State to provide
notice to the defendant of its intent to introduce a certificate of
laboratory analysis, to which admission the defendant may then
object.123 However, if he does not object, he waives his objection to
118. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 ("Respondent asserts that we should find no
Confrontation Clause violation in this case because petitioner had the ability to subpoena the
analysts. But that power-whether pursuant to state law or the Compulsory Process Clause-is
no substitute for the right of confrontation. Unlike the Confrontation Clause, those provisions are
of no use to the defendant when the witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear.").
119. Id.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12L Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *11, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No.
07-11191), 2008 WL 6485425 (quoting Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 16 (D.C. 2006)).
122. H.D. 5007, 2009 Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Va. 2009).
123. If the defendant objects and the person who performed the analysis or examination or the
custodian of the records is unavailable to testify in the State's case-in-chief, the court will order a
continuance not to exceed 180 days for a person who is not incarcerated and ninety days when the
person is incarcerated. There is also a provision for a continuance if the defendant did not receive
timely notice. This makes it easier for both the State and the analyst to respond to common
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the introduction of the certificate or affidavit, and it may be offered
into evidence without the appearance and testimony of the analyst or
custodian.124 Even so, the defendant would have the right to call the
analyst as an adverse witness during the defense's case at the State's
expense.'
In this situation, there seems to be no problem with Virginia
House Bill 5007 if the defendant objects in a timely manner.
According to Scalia, the defendant's ability to call the analyst during
his own case-in-chief if he fails to object unfairly shifts the burden of
producing the witness to the defendant.126 However, the State
attempts to assuage this unfair shift in burden by requiring the state
to pay for transporting the witness to testify.'27 Thus, the defendant
has one clearly constitutional option to compel the analyst to testify,
as well as a hybrid option that may vacillate between
constitutionality and unconstitutionality depending on the terms of
the first option. For example, if the defendant is afforded a
reasonable amount of time to object on the front end and fails to do
so, the subpoena option is a superfluous alternative and should not be
unconstitutional, regardless of who covers expenses because the
defendant was already afforded a clear and constitutional opportunity
to compel the analyst to testify at the outset.
However, if the Court finds the timing or manner in which a
defendant must object is unreasonable, and therefore
unconstitutional, the provision preserving the defendant's right to
call the analyst as an adverse witness will not save the statute from
being held to violate his right to confrontation, as its individual
constitutionality is highly questionable.
In essence then, the key seems to be how restrictive a protocol
the Court will permit for the first option. The next sections explore
scheduling demands and should not pose any constitutional problems because "[s]tates are free to
adopt procedural rules governing objections." Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.
124. Va. H.D. 5007.
125. Information on breath-test machine testing accuracy is also removed as a component of
the DUI breath certificate of analysis. See id. This part of the bill is interesting as it is reminiscent
of the Roberts test, which allowed hearsay to be admitted as long as it met certain "indicia of
reliability." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004).
126. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540.
127. Va. H.D. 5007.
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which elements of notice-and-demand-plus and anticipatory demand
statutes are constitutionally acceptable tools to be used by the states.
1. How Long Before Trial Should a State Be Required to
Provide Notice to a Defendant That It Intends to
Introduce a Lab Report as Evidence?
The first question is whether a state is required to provide notice
to the defendant that it intends to introduce a forensic lab report
during the trial. As discussed above, Melendez-Diaz seems to require
the provision of notice in situations where testimonial lab reports are
offered into evidence. If so, then the next issues to settle are: (1) how
long before trial must a state give notice; and (2) how long before
trial must a defendant respond with his demand. The majority
opinion in Melendez-Diaz makes clear that states are free to make
laws governing this amount of time.128
North Carolina's governor signed Senate Bill 252 into law on
August 26, 2009. The Bill's drafters structured the Bill's procedure
to be compatible with the types of statutes Justice Scalia regarded as
acceptable in Melendez-Diaz.12 9  Senate Bill 252 requires the
prosecution to give notice of its intention to use a lab report at least
fifteen days before trial and gives the defendant the right to file a
written objection no fewer than five days before trial.130 If the
defendant timely objects and the analyst is unavailable to testify, a
continuance will be granted."' If the defendant fails to timely object,
then the analyst's affidavit may be used in court without the analyst
128. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.
129. "The General Assembly revised several other statutes that govern the procedure for
admitting lab reports, including G.S. §§ 8-58.20 and 90-95. [Senate Bill 252] . . . 'makes them the
kind of statutes that the court approved of in Melendez-Diaz as what it described as simple notice-
and-demand statutes."' Guy Loranger, North Carolina Confronts Melendez-Diaz Ruling, N.C.
LAW. WKLY., Aug. 17, 2009, at 5 (citation omitted).
130. Prior to the recent revision, North Carolina's law was a notice-and-demand-plus statute
requiring the defense to submit an affidavit specifying the following: the facts to which the
chemical analyst will testify; the factual grounds on which the defense believes the chemical
analysis was not properly made; and that the necessity of the presence of the analyst to a proper
defense. The court then had to determine whether there were grounds to believe that the presence
of the analyst requested was necessary for the proper defense. JESSICA SMITH, MELENDEZ-DIAZ
AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF FORENSIC LABORATORY REPORTS AND CHEMICAL ANALYST
AFFIDAVITS IN NORTH CAROLINA POST-CRA WFORD 4-5 (July 2, 2009), http://www.sog.unc.edu/
programs/crimlaw/melendez-diaz.pdf.
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(e2) (2006). While a good vehicle for dealing with the
majority of cases when an analyst is unavailable, this continuance provision does not resolve the
hypothetical where the analyst is deceased or permanently unavailable.
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having to testify.13 2 Presently, states employ a range of statutory time
provisions for a defendant's objections."'
An Ohio state law requires prosecutors to give defense lawyers
notice if drug lab reports will be introduced into evidence.13 4
Following notice, the defense lawyers have seven days to demand
that the lab analyst testify as to the test results.'3 5 This statutory
window may be extended if the interests of justice so require."' As
long as the amount of time is reasonable-that is, it does not deprive
the defendant of procedural due process-it appears that the states
have the power to control the time by which defendants must state
their objections.3 7
Presumably, a state that really wanted to reduce the amount of
Melendez-Diaz objections it received could legislatively narrow the
window in which the defendant could object. For example, a statute
may pronounce that the State must give notice of its intent to
introduce a forensic report as evidence no fewer than thirty days
before trial and require the defendant to object no fewer than twenty-
eight days before trial or he will have waived his statutory right to
have the State call the witness. While this two-day window may not
be considered reasonable, a state would need some guidance from
the Court as to what would or would not be a constitutionally
reasonable amount of time to allow defendants to object. As of this
moment, that guidance does not exist.
At this point, one possible indicator may be to look to what the
Court has stated regarding the amount of time required to give a
party a chance to object so as not to violate procedural due process in
other areas of the law.' The basic function of due process is to
132. Id. § 20-139.1(c3), 20-139.1(e2).
133. Demand dates vary from state to state. Compare ALA. CODE 12-21-302(a) (2006)
(requiring the defendant to issue demand at least thirty days prior to trial) with DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 4332(a) (2009) (requiring the defendant to issue demand at least five days prior to trial).
134. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2925.51 (West 2006).
135. See State v. Smith, No. 1-05-39, 2006 WL 846342, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2006)
("[T]he actions required of the defendant are not burdensome; if he wishes to examine the
technician he need only indicate that desire to the prosecutor within seven days. The statute even
provides that the time period for notification can be extended beyond seven days if 'the interests
of justice' so require.").
136. Id.
137. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009).
138. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause ordinarily requires notice and an opportunity to
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provide "an opportunity to be heard .. . at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."' In Goldberg v. Kelly,140 a case that dealt with
the deprivation of welfare benefits, the Court stated, "We are not
prepared to say that the seven-day notice currently provided by New
York City is constitutionally insufficient per se, although there may
be cases where fairness would require that a longer time be given." 4 1
In Mathews v. Eldridge,14 2 the Court stated that due process requires
case-by-case evaluation:
"[D]ue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances. Due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.
Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the
administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally
sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private
interests that are affected.143
If these due process guidelines apply to notice-and-demand
statutes, then the courts may decide whether defendants are given
sufficient advance notice on a case-by-case basis. In such
circumstances, the trial judge would balance the defendant's interest
in the right to object and demand the witness's appearance against
the State's interest in keeping its administrative and fiscal burdens
reasonable. Although state legislatures may prefer clearer guidance
on how to tailor their notice-and-demand statutes so as to avoid
having the statutes struck down as unconstitutional, this type of case-
be heard when the government seeks to deprive a person of "life, liberty, or property." See
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
139. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (citation omitted).
140. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
141. Id. at 268.
142. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
143. Id at 334 (citations omitted). The Court further stated:
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates
of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Id at 334-35.
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by-case balancing may be all they have to rely upon until the
Supreme Court rules with more specificity.
2. What Substantive Facts Must the Prosecution
Include in Its Notice?
The Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Melendez-Diaz argued
that the critical point in judging whether one of these notice statutes
is acceptable or not rests upon the defendant's ability to retain his
opportunity to exercise his rights under the Confrontation Clause and
to choose when and whether to waive those rights.1" Two of the
professors who contributed to that amicus brief wrote separately to
point out that "the waiver of a constitutional right typically requires
the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Defense counsel,
however, cannot make an informed decision without adequate
information, and lab reports often do not provide that information."l45
They explained that some lab reports contain only a bare conclusion,
not even specifying the methods used in the test.'46 In these
circumstances, it would be difficult for a defendant to be able to
provide an informed waiver of his constitutional right to
confrontation, since he lacks the requisite information on which to
object. This analysis leads us to inquire as to what type and how
much information the notice to the defendant must contain.
Seemingly, the defendant should at least be given information
sufficient to render him able to appreciate the consequences of his
failure to object to the state's notice.'4 7 In particular, it is argued he
144. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 60, at 15.
145. 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 6.04[c], at
382 (4th ed. 2007).
146. Id at 382 n.276.
147. See State v. Smith, No. 1-05-39, 2006 WL 846342, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2006)
("The State's notification ... makes no mention . . . that failure to make the demand will permit
the laboratory report to serve as prima facie evidence of the conclusions in the report without the
testimony of the technician. . . . The demand requirement . . . does not indicate to the defendant
that the report will serve as prima facie evidence unless a written demand for the technician's
testimony is made. This notice is insufficient to fully inform the defendant of the consequences of
failing to demand the witness's testimony, and without such notice the defendant cannot be said
to have knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights."); see also State
v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 313 (Minn. 2006) ("At a minimum, any statute purporting to admit
testimonial reports without the testimony of the preparer must provide adequate notice to the
defendant of the contents of the report and the likely consequences of his failure to request the
testimony of the preparer. Otherwise, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the defendant's
failure to request the testimony constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his
confrontation rights." (emphases added)).
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must understand that by failing to act, he waives one of his
constitutional rights.'4 8
Depending on the substantive requirements of the demand, the
notice may have to include specifics about the scientific process used
in the test in addition to spelling out the consequences of the
defendant's failure to object.14 9 For example, a defendant would need
to have some idea of the procedures used so that he could effectively
challenge them if a state requires the defendant to show cause for
wanting to confront the witness as part of his demand, then
presumably the defendant would need to have some idea of the
procedures used so that he could effectively challenge them. It would
otherwise seem to cut against the prohibitory tradition against unfair
trials by ex parte statements championed by Justice Scalia.
3. Is a State Allowed to Require Substantive Elements as
Part of a Defendant's Demand?
Is it constitutional to require that a defendant include anything
other than a plain demand to confront a witness? Does requiring the
defendant to show good faith when objecting to the admission of a
report shift the burden go too far?' Is it fair to compel the defendant
to disclose how he plans to cross-examine the witness? Amici in
Melendez-Diaz opposed any type of statute more rigorous than a
simple notice-and-demand type when they asserted that "[o]nly
statutes that unambiguously guarantee the defendant the opportunity
to cross-examine forensic experts upon a simple demand to do so
satisfy Crawford's. admonition that no law shall deprive a defendant
'of seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the
ordeal of a cross-examination."'" However, requiring a defendant to
148. Smith, 2006 WL 846342, at *7.
149. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
150. The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed this question in State v. Cunningham, 04-2200,
p.18 (La. 06/13/05); 903 So. 2d 1110, 1122, stating that:
Because the good-faith certification . . . is imposed only on the defendant, it must be
construed so as not to be an unconstitutional violation of the confrontation clause.
Consequently, the burden to demonstrate good faith must be featherweight so as not to
adversely impact the defendant's right to confrontation. The defendant can satisfy the
good-faith requirement by merely indicating a preference for live testimony by
requesting a subpoena [be] issue[d] for the preparer of the certificate of analysis.
Id.
151. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 60, at 15-
16 n.3 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 244 (1895))).
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show cause, pledge a good-faith basis for demanding an appearance,
and promise to cross-examine the demanded witness if he is forced
to appear hardly deprives a defendant of his procedural rights-if
anything, such requirements merely prevent abuse by wily attorneys.
On the other hand, because the State bears the burden of proof in all
criminal trials, there is a convincing argument that the defendant
should not have to assert any effort to produce witnesses for the
benefit of the State. 152
As we did when determining the scope of the statutory window
in which to pose a Melendez-Diaz objection, it may be helpful to
analyze whether substantive elements may be required as part of a
defendant's demand by applying the due process balancing test set
forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. Under this system, a state could
legitimately require substantive elements, such as a stated basis for
wanting to cross-examine an analyst, as long as the state's logistical
interest in doing so could be shown to outweigh the defendant's
interest in being able to make a simple demand.15 As mentioned
previously, this balancing process would have to be applied in a
case-by-case manner to accommodate the varying interests in any
given case. It would seem that states could validly require
substantive demands as part of their statutory schemes, and allow
their courts to invalidate certain applications on an ad hoc basis in
individual cases where the due process interests favor the defendant.
Until the Court sets forth a clear standard describing what states may
or may not require of a defendant in his demand to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, states will remain able to tailor their
notice-and-demand laws with minimal restraint.
152. In State v. Laturner, 218 P.3d 23 (Kan. 2009), the Kansas Supreme Court held that
sections 22-3437 and 53-601 of the Kansas Statutes, which governed the admissibility of forensic
laboratory certificates of analysis, imposed too heavy a burden on a defendant's Confrontation
Clause rights and thus were unconstitutional when applied in a criminal case. The statutes
required that a defendant state grounds for an objection to the use of the certificate and provided
that a proffered certificate would be admitted in evidence unless it meets the narrowly defined,
permissible objection. The court relied on State v. Miller, 790 A.2d 144, 153, 154-55 (N.J. 2002),
in which the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the State has the burden to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt and that a defendant should not be required "to vault a legal hurdle" in order
to exercise his or her right to confront state witnesses.
153. See id.
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4. At What Point During a Trial Should a Witness Appear?
Petitioners in Briscoe advanced several different points as to
why the Virginia defense subpoena law and its brethren should be
deemed unconstitutional. Interpreting the Constitution textually, they
first argued the use of the passive voice in the Confrontation Clause
imposes the burden to produce the witness on the prosecution, not
the defense. 15 4
Next, they made several advocacy-based arguments that having
to call a witness during the defense's case is strategically
disadvantageous to the defendant."' First, petitioners argued that the
difference in timing between when the evidence is presented and
when the analyst is questioned is inequitable when the witness must
appear as part of the defense's case.156 Essentially, they maintained
that when the written report is admitted during the first part of the
trial, with the defense only able to call the analyst to be questioned
during its own case, the jury is made to consider the evidence twice.
This leaves a stronger impression of it in the jury's collective mind'
and allows the jury to form an initial opinion of the evidence during
the prosecution's case that may be difficult for the defendant to
overcome. Furthermore, such repetition may prejudice the defendant
if the trier of fact thinks the defense is harassing the witness by
making him rehash his statement."' It is to be inferred that this
irritation could then adversely affect the way the trier of fact
154. See Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 16 (D.C. 2006) ("The Confrontation Clause
guarantees the accused the right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him.' This language,
employing the passive voice, imposes a burden of production on the prosecution, not on the
defense."); State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 332 n.22 (Md. 2005) (rejecting the theory that the
defendant could call his accusers to the stand because the "[b]urden of production . .. is placed on
the State [by the Confrontation Clause] to produce affirmatively the witnesses needed for its
prima facie showing of the defendant's guilt").
155. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 121, at 13.
156. Id. ("[S]ome time, perhaps substantial, has passed since the witness's (written)
testimonial statement has been presented to the trier of fact, and presumably a much greater time
since the witness made that statement. The time gap may be critical, as explained in the oft-
quoted language of State v. Saporen, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (Minn. 1939): 'The chief merit of cross
examination is not that at some future time it gives the party opponent the right to dissect adverse
testimony. Its principal virtue is in its immediate application of the testing process. Its strokes fall
while the iron is hot."').
157. Right of Confrontation: Admissibility of Declaration by Co-Conspirator, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 188, 195 (1971) (stating that "even a direct examination successful from the defendant's
perspective is less effective than cross-examination because . . . the damaging hearsay will have
to be repeated during the examination, thereby increasing its impact").
158. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 121, at 14.
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perceives the defendant and weighs the evidence against him.
Additionally, forcing the defendant to call a prosecution-friendly
witness in the middle of his own case may disrupt the strategy that
his attorney would otherwise employ.'
Judging from the Court's statements in Melendez-Diaz and its
inertia with respect to the Confrontation Clause in general, it was
foreseeable that the Court would agree with these points in deciding
Briscoe and maintain that a state cannot avoid violating the
Confrontation Clause by merely providing the accused the right to
call the analyst as his own witness. Rather, testimonial witnesses
such as lab analysts must be called during the prosecution's case-in-
chief. However, the argument that defense subpoena provisions may
disadvantage a defendant from an advocacy perspective, and should
thus be deemed unconstitutional, is somewhat less than convincing
considering that the Court disregarded its inverse in Melendez-
Diaz.160 To be sure, the burdens imposed on prosecutions by the
ruling in that case certainly disadvantage the state in its ability to
advocate successfully; however, they were not held to be
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, it would seem that, based on the
strong dicta in Melendez-Diaz,"6 ' the Court, or at least Justice Scalia,
159. "[The defense] must disrupt its own case if it wishes to examine the technician, and give
the prosecution an opportunity to examine a witness friendly to it in the middle of the defense
case." Brief of Petitioners at 20, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-11191),
2009 WL 2861541; see also Janeen Kerper, The Art and Ethics of Direct Examination, 22 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvOC. 377, 411 (1998) ("Because the witness is unfriendly and because your opponent
will have the opportunity to cross-examine a favorable witness in the middle of your case-in-
chief, you will not want to call an adverse witness unless absolutely necessary.").
160. The Court wrote in Melendez-Diaz that "[tihe Confrontation Clause may make the
prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and
the privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause-like those other constitutional
provisions-is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience." Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009).
161. In Melendez-Diaz, the Court stated:
Respondent asserts that we should find no Confrontation Clause violation in this case
because petitioner had the ability to subpoena the analysts. But that power-whether
pursuant to state law or the Compulsory Process Clause-is no substitute for the right
of confrontation. Unlike the Confrontation Clause, those provisions are of no use to the
defendant when the witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear. Converting the
prosecution's duty under the Confrontation Clause into the defendant's privilege under
state law or the Compulsory Process Clause shifts the consequences of adverse-witness
no-shows from the State to the accused. More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause
imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to
bring those adverse witnesses into court. Its value to the defendant is not replaced by a
system in which the prosecution presents its evidence via ex parte affidavits and waits
for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he chooses.
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is not open to argument with respect to when an analyst or witness
must be called.
B. Peer-Review and Surrogate Testimony
Where an analyst is unavailable due to death, illness, relocation,
or any other conflict, courts must determine when an analyst's peer
may testify about the results of a lab test in lieu of the original
analyst taking the stand, and who may act as the surrogate. 162
The Law Professor Amici in Melendez-Diaz proposed a
framework for determining when surrogate testimony is acceptable
just as they did for evaluating the constitutionality of notice-and-
demand statutes.'6' They derive their reasons for allowing surrogate
testimony from language in Crawford that permitted prior testimony
to be entered into evidence where the defendant had a previous
opportunity to cross-examine a witness who is unavailable to testify
in court." Based on this acquiescence, it may be inferred that
"Crawford . . . indicates that [when] there is a meaningful but
imperfect substitute for contemporaneous cross-examination, the
Constitution does not command wholesale exclusion."1 65 Also, the
expert on the stand would be subject to cross-examination by the
defense, and would thus be prone to exposing any deficiencies in the
reliability of the testimony.
Id. at 2540 (citation omitted).
162. A petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed in Pendergrass v. Indiana, 913 N.E.2d
703 (Ind. 2009). The question presented is "[w]hether the Confrontation Clause permits the
prosecution to introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst through the in-
court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe the laboratory
analysis described in the statements." Brief of the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at i, Pendergrass v. Indiana, 913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2009)
(No. 09-866), 2010 WL 666233.
163. The framework suggests that:
In narrowly circumscribed circumstances-(1) conducting another test is infeasible; (2)
the original test was conducted in accordance with regularized procedures and
documented in sufficient detail for another expert to understand, interpret, and evaluate
the results[;] and (3) the original expert is now unavailable-a plausible argument
exists that surrogate testimony by another qualified expert ought to be constitutionally
permissible.
Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 60, at 23.
164. Indeed, Crawford explicitly recognized that the Confrontation Clause "does not bar the
use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted."
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004).
165. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 60, at 21.
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During oral argument in Melendez-Diaz, counsel for appellants
suggested that an expert would not be a legitimate substitute for the
analyst who prepared the report appearing for cross-examination.166
However, there is no clear rule, and state and federal courts have thus
far allowed this method to be used when an analyst is unavailable."'
The Federal Rules of Evidence set forth the bases upon which an
expert may testify.168 Although Federal Rule of Evidence 703 permits
166. The following statements were made during oral argument:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You say . . . "the analyst." I suppose it doesn't have to
be the analyst but whoever they decide to call. So if you had a supervisor who runs the
cocaine testing lab and he is the one whose report is submitted, I take it he is the one
who would have to show up.
MR. FISHER: That's right. Our position . .. is that whoever the Commonwealth wants
to use to prove the fact that they are trying to prove is the person that needs to take the
stand. In this case, it would be the analyst.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 94, at 4.
167. See State v. Cannady, No. COA07-274, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 2537, at *10-13 (Ct.
App. Dec. 18, 2007) (holding that expert testimony based on analysis conducted by someone
other than the testifying expert does not violate a defendant's right to confrontation under
Crawford); State v. Pettis, 651 S.E.2d 231, 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that an expert
testifying based on contents of DNA report prepared by a nontestifying agent is not a
Confrontation Clause violation and noting, "[I]t is well established [that there is no violation of a
defendant's right of confrontation under the rationale of Crawford when] an expert ... base[s] an
opinion on tests performed by others in the field and [d]efendant was given an opportunity to
cross-examine [the testifying expert] on the basis of his opinion") (citation omitted); State v.
Delaney, 613 S.E.2d 699, 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that an analyst who did not prepare
a laboratory report but relies on it as a basis for expert opinion at trial is not a Confrontation
Clause violation because "[t]he admission into evidence of expert opinion based upon
information not itself admissible into evidence does not violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of the right of an accused to confront his accusers where the expert is available for cross-
examination") (citation omitted). But see United States v. Williams, 431 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th
Cir. 1970) ("If the witness has gone to only one hearsay source and seeks merely to summarize
the content of that source, then he is acting as a summary witness, not an expert. Since he is
introducing the content of the extrajudicial statements or writings to prove truth, his testimony,
like its source, is hearsay and is inadmissible unless the source qualifies under an exception to the
hearsay rule. When, however, the witness has gone to many sources-although some or all be
hearsay in nature-and rather than introducing mere summaries of each source he uses them all,
along with his own professional experience, to arrive at his opinion, that opinion is regarded as
evidence in its own right and not as an attempt to introduce hearsay in disguise.").
168. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the
opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting
the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
FED. R. EvID. 703.
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an expert to testify and give his opinion regarding information or a
report in a particular case, it seems that in order to legitimately be
able to have an expert testify and give his conclusions about an
unavailable analyst's report, that report must contain something more
than bare conclusions.' More specifically, the report should contain
sufficient facts or data on which the analyst may base his
conclusion.'70
In United States v. Moon,"' the Seventh Circuit held that a
reviewing scientist "was entitled to analyze the data that [the first
scientist] had obtained," noting that "the Sixth Amendment does not
demand that a chemist or other testifying expert have done the lab
work himself."' 7 2 Similarly, in United States v. Richardson,"' the
Eighth Circuit determined that an expert did not violate the
Confrontation Clause by testifying about a peer's analysis
confirming a match of the defendant's DNA with the DNA found on
a firearm because the expert was cross-examined about her own
conclusions.'74 The court reasoned that "[a]lthough [the testifying
expert] did not actually perform the tests, she had an independent
responsibility to do the peer review. Her testimony concerned her
independent conclusions derived from another scientist's tests [sic]
results and did not violate the Confrontation Clause.""' A California
court of appeal relied on Moon and Richardson in deciding People v.
Rutterschmidt,"' determining that peer-review testimony did not
violate the defendant's right to confrontation since the unavailable
analyst's report was not admitted into evidence."' Instead, an
169. See Williams, 431 F.2d at 1172; supra note 145 and accompanying text; cf Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) ("[W]e do not think it conceivable that the protections of
the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite the
unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant sign a deposition.").
170. See Williams, 431 F.2d at 1172 (stating that a witness may offer his own opinion, which
was reached after analyzing and synthesizing several sources). This suggests that the material
relied upon would need to contain adequate detail from which a surrogate witness could derive a
reliable opinion. In the case of laboratory reports, these specifics may include the sample size, the
type of test used, the number of times the test was performed on the sample, and the degree of
accuracy of the type of test utilized.
171. 512 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2008).
172. Id. at 362.
173. 537 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2008).
174. Id. at 961.
175. Id. at 960.
176. 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390 (Ct. App. 2009).
177. Id. at 408.
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expert's opinions based on that report were given as live testimony,
subject to cross-examination.'"
Melendez-Diaz has left uncertain whether the results of a
forensic test-or, at a minimum, an expert's opinion of the test
results-may still be admitted into evidence when extraordinary
circumstances render an analyst unavailable.
Despite the Law Professor Amici's suggestion that surrogate
testimony should be allowed under Crawford in certain
circumstances, there are already signs that the practice may be
considered problematic. In 2007, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided
State v. Crager,7 1 which held that allowing one expert to testify on
another's lab results did not violate the defendant's rights.'" Crager
was a murder case in which a lab analyst testified regarding DNA
tests conducted by another analyst who was unavailable because she
was on maternity leave at the time of the trial.' The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, then vacated the judgment and remanded the case
to the Supreme Court of Ohio for further consideration in light of the
freshly minted Melendez-Diaz holding.12
However, the Ohio Court does not seem to have any more
guidance to sensibly decide this question than it did prior to
Melendez-Diaz. Furthermore, this issue was not resolved by the
178. Id The Court of Appeal endorsed this peer-review approach, stating that:
The Federal Rules of Evidence are in accord. Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides: "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or
data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent
of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.
Id at 413 (emphasis added).
179. 116 Ohio St. 3d 369, 2007-Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745.
180. The court stated:
A criminal defendant's constitutional right to confrontation is not violated when a
DNA analyst testifies at his trial in place of the DNA analyst who conducted the DNA
testing. Neither records which are admissible under the business records exception to
the rule against hearsay nor expert testimony, are testimonial under Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id at$ 37.
181. Id at $ 8.
182. Crager v. Ohio, 129 S. Ct. 2856 (2009).
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Court's decision in Briscoe. Therefore, it could be a while before
lower courts are given uniform instruction on how to handle tactics
such as offering peer-review testimony, formed in response to
Melendez-Diaz's expansion of the Confrontation Clause. This
collateral uncertainty and heterogeneity among the courts appears to
be another unfortunate effect of putting one's interpretivist
philosophy ahead of pragmatism and thereby issuing undeveloped
rules,' rather than allowing a trial court the discretion to decide
whether circumstances warrant allowing secondary solutions like
admission of surrogate testimony.
For the time being, it appears that surrogate expert testimony
that meets the requirements of the state's version of Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 may constitutionally be used to introduce into
evidence the substance of an unavailable analyst's findings when it
would otherwise be unfeasible to transmit that information to the
finder of fact.
C. Is Testimony Via Video-Conferencing a Legitimate
Substitute for Live, In-Court Testimony?
Like surrogate testimony, video-conferencing has been proposed
as an alternative to live, in-court testimony by the analyst who
completed the report in question.'84 However helpful this method
may prove to be in terms of lessening the burdens on state
prosecutions, similar attempts to test the stringency of the right to
confrontation have been met with Constitutional disapproval by the
Court.' In Coy v. Iowa,"' where a large screen was placed between
183. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 65-94 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
184. See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 60, at
18; Tom Jackman, Virginia Rushes to Address Ruling on Analysts: Drug-Case Demands Have
Strained State Lab, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/17/AR2009081702302.html ("Legislators last week also
considered allowing videoconferencing so that forensic scientists could testify from their offices
and allowing field-testing of heroin and cocaine by police to be admitted as evidence. Those ideas
did not make it into the final bills, which legislators hope will emerge identical from the House
and Senate committees Tuesday and be approved by both houses Wednesday without the need for
a conference committee.").
185. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); see also Anthony Garofano, Avoiding Virtual
Justice: Video-Teleconference Testimony in Federal Criminal Trials, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 683,
702 (2007) ("The jury's inability to see the entire witness may limit its ability to evaluate that
witness' credibility and value as evidence-impairing an important function of the jury in
criminal trials.").
186. 487 U.S. 1012.
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the witnesses-two young girls who had allegedly been sexually
assaulted by the defendant-and the accused, the Court held that the
use of the screen violated Coy's right to confront the witnesses
against him."' Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that the
Confrontation Clause "confers at least 'a right to meet face to face all
those who appear and give evidence at trial.""" This proclamation
strongly suggests that video-conferencing will not be a constitutional
substitute for live, in-court testimony. Two years after Coy, however,
the Court declared that the guarantees of the Confrontation Clause
"may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial
only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an
important public policy and only where the reliability of the
testimony is otherwise assured."'8 9 Whether allowing video
testimony to ease Melendez-Diaz's burden on prosecutors constitutes
a public policy more important than physical confrontation will
likely depend upon how much clout Justice Scalia commands within
the Court's new lineup.
D. Narrowing the Reach of the Confrontation Clause
State courts may be able to cleverly apply Melendez-Diaz's
ruling to minimize its burden on prosecutors. Justice Thomas's
separate concurring opinion explains that he voted with the majority
because the Melendez-Diaz reports were also affidavits, and
affidavits are among the testimonial materials that clearly trigger the
Confrontation Clause.' Where forensic evidence does not so clearly
fit within this core class of testimonial statements, a creative state
judge could view Melendez-Diaz as a plurality opinion of four votes
from the Court that is therefore persuasive but not binding.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1016 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970)).
189. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990). In determining the assurance of the
reliability element, the Court focused on the "elements of confrontation":
The combined effect of these elements of confrontation-physical presence, oath,
cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact-serves the
purposes of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against an
accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm of
Anglo-American criminal proceedings.
Id at 846.
190. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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To accomplish the end he sought in deciding Melendez-Diaz,
Justice Scalia relied on language from Justice Thomas's concurrence
in White v. Illinois: "The Confrontation Clause is implicated by
extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions.""' Once Justice Scalia concluded
that the analyst's report was an affidavit,'9 2 Justice Thomas had no
option but to vote with the majority.'93 However, in his short
concurrence, Justice Thomas distanced himself from Justice Scalia's
certitude by reiterating his position from his concurrences in White'94
and Davis.'95
In White, Justice Thomas attempted to strike a balance between
opposing views of how the Confrontation Clause should be
interpreted."' Its most strict interpretation, he said, "would be to
construe the phrase 'witnesses against him' to confer on a defendant
the right to confront and cross-examine only those witnesses who
actually appear and testify at trial. This was Wigmore's view."'
Justice Thomas stated his belief that the difficulty with the Wigmore
view is its tension with the history and evolution of the right of
confrontation.'9 8 He delved into the common-law history of the
Confrontation Clause and discussed the 1603 treason trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh, where ex parte affidavits were used as the Crown's
primary evidence against Raleigh.'99 He explained that the right to
confrontation began to develop in response to cases like this, and that
the Sixth Amendment codified this pre-existing common law
191. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)
(Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
192. Supra note 44 and accompanying text.
193. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas states, "I join the Court's opinion in this case
because the documents at issue in this case 'are quite plainly affidavits.' As such, they 'fall within
the core class of testimonial statements' governed by the Confrontation Clause." Melendez-Diaz,
129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
194. White, 502 U.S. at 358-66 (Thomas, J., concurring).
195. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813. 840 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (characterizing statements within the scope of the Confrontation Clause to
include those that are "sufficiently formal to resemble the Marian examinations").
196. White, 502 U.S. at 358-66.
197. 1d at 359.
198. Id. at 360.
199. Id at 361.
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tradition.200 He asserted that there is little, if any, historical evidence
that this tradition was meant to limit exceptions to the hearsay rule,
and that "[t]he standards that the Court has developed to implement
its assumption that the Confrontation Clause limits admission of
hearsay evidence have no basis in the text of the Sixth
Amendment." 201
Justice Thomas then considered a broader view, posited by the
United States in White, that "the Confrontation Clause should apply
only to those persons who provide in-court testimony or the
functional equivalent, such as affidavits, depositions, or confessions
that are made in contemplation of legal proceedings."20 2 He found
this view more in line with the history and spirit of the right of
confrontation, but he also foresaw the possibility that its application
"might develop in a manner not entirely consistent with the crucial
'witnesses against him' phrase." 20 3 Much like the dissenting justices
in Melendez-Diaz, Justice Thomas foresaw and discussed some of
the practical concerns in applying this rule henceforth.204
After finding the Wigmore view too narrow and the United
States view too broad, Justice Thomas proposed a middle-ground
approach to interpreting the Confrontation Clause: "The federal
constitutional right of confrontation extends to any witness who
actually testifies at trial, but the Confrontation Clause is implicated
by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions. "205 He intentionally limited the field
of materials that trigger the clause to those that were historically
abused by prosecutors as a means used to deprive criminal
defendants of the benefits of the adversary process.206 As forensic test
results do not squarely fit within that category of materials used to
deprive defendants of the benefits of the adversary process, it seems
that extending the right of confrontation to these types of evidence
runs counter to the spirit and purpose of the tradition. It is likely that
200. Id. at 361-62.
201. Id. at 363 (referring to the Ohio v. Roberts "indicia of reliability" test).
202. Id at 364.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id at 365.
206. Id
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this is why Justice Thomas felt compelled to write a separate
concurrence in Melendez-Diaz, voting with the majority only
because the evidence in that case fell within the core class of
testimonial statements governed by the Confrontation Clause, and
may be a crucial point in future Confrontation Clause cases.
Similarly, in Davis, Justice Thomas presented a historical
narrative of the right to confrontation, and explained that it was
developed to target particular practices that occurred under the
English bail-and-committal statutes passed during the reign of Queen
Mary, namely the "civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and. . . its
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused."20 7 He
explained that "[t]he predominant purpose of the [Marian committal]
statute was to institute systematic questioning of the accused and the
witnesses."20 8 These examinations came to be used as evidence in
some cases, in lieu of a personal appearance by the witness.2 09 Justice
Thomas maintained that the Framers intended the Confrontation
Clause to prevent these kinds of statements from being introduced as
evidence as they would constitute "overly broad exceptions to the
hearsay rule."210
State courts are already cleverly exploiting this chink in the
Melendez-Diaz holding. In California, for example, a court of appeal
recently upheld a conviction for forcible oral copulation based
partially on a report prepared by a non-testifying nurse practitioner.2 11
The court read Davis in a way that rendered Melendez-Diaz
inapplicable, since the report in Davis constituted a contemporaneous
recordation of observable events.212 The court followed the reasoning
from People v. Geier,2 13 which held that there was no Confrontation
Clause violation because the observations of the non-testifying
207. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 835 (2006).
208. Id. (emphasis omitted). The statute required an oral examination of the suspect and the
accusers, transcription within two days of the examinations, and physical transmission to the
judges hearing the case.
209. Id. at 836.
210. Id. (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result))
(rejecting the "assumption that the core purpose of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment is to prevent overly broad exceptions to the hearsay rule").
211. People v. Gutierrez, 177 Cal. App. 4th 654, 654 (Ct. App. 2009).
212. Id.
213. People v. Geier, 41 Cal. 4th 555 (2007), cert. denied, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4946 (U.S. June
29, 2009).
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technician were a contemporaneous recordation of observable events
rather than the documentation of past events and thus were not
testimonial.2 14 In discussing whether the U.S. Supreme Court had
"disapproved" of Geier since Melendez-Diaz, the court considered a
recent California case2 15 that "held that laboratory reports of the type
presented in Geier" are testimonial 216 and responded as follows: "We
disagree, because Melendez-Diaz did not involve 'laboratory reports
of the type presented in Geier'-Melendez-Diaz involved 'near-
contemporaneous' affidavits that were completed nearly a week after
the tests were performed, whereas Geier involved contemporaneous
recordation of observable events."2 17 Such meticulous reading of
Melendez-Diaz enables state courts to avoid compelling lab analysts
to testify unless the records at issue fit squarely within the core class
of testimonial materials thus far recognized by the Court.
Justice Thomas's reasoning and Justice Sotomayor's
replacement of Justice Souter may lead the Court to narrow the
application of the Confrontation Clause. It is unlikely that another
opportunity like Briscoe will arise any time soon. When it does,
however, the Court should take the opportunity to finally define what
a testimonial statement is and, more urgently, to overrule Melendez-
Diaz's overreaching classification of lab analysts as testimonial
witnesses to ease the states' burden and allow them to prosecute
criminal defendants the way they choose.
V. JUSTIFICATION
The meaning, import, and application of the Confrontation
Clause have not been static over the course of Western legal
history.2 18 In the words of the 1970 U.S. Supreme Court, the
language of the Confrontation Clause "comes to us on faded
parchment."219 Nevertheless, more than two hundred years after the
Bill of Rights was adopted, the Court has decreed not only what the
clause means but also what constitutionally required procedure it
214. Id. at 607.
215. People v. Lopez, 177 Cal. App. 4th 202, 206 (2009).
216. Id.
217. Gutierrez, 177 Cal. App. 4th at 664 n.3.
218. Cornelius M. Murphy, Justice Scalia and the Confrontation Clause: A Case Study in
Originalist Adjudication ofIndividual Rights, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1243, 1244 (1997).
219. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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demands and which witnesses are subject to those demands.
Although the originalist method used to decipher and proclaim the
resolution of these ambiguities provides some rule to follow
henceforth,220 it simultaneously leaves another batch of ambiguities
to be resolved in its wake.
The Court long ago addressed the possibility of exceptions to
these Confrontation Clause guarantees stating that "general rules of
law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable
to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case."22 1
Indeed, strict originalism may not be the school of constitutional
interpretation that provides the most reasonable result in this area in
light of the last two hundred years' advances in technology and
forensic science and of the public interest in judicial and general
efficiency. As the late Justice Brennan noted,
[T]he ultimate question must be, what do the words of the
text mean in our time. For the genius of the Constitution
rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world
that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and current needs.
What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom
of other times cannot be their measure to the vision of our
time.222
The accuracy and mechanical nature of contemporary forensic
testing affords results of a type that could not have been foreseen by
the Framers of the Bill of Rights. Scientific test results are, in their
purpose, completely distinct from the ex parte affidavits that
convicted Raleigh of treason. They are not motivated by any animus
or drive to convict; instead, they report the outcomes of scientific
tests that may or may not lead to unfavorable results for the accused.
If the test results do, however, contribute to conviction, it is not for
the animus of the lab analyst, but for the transgression of the
accused.
220. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
129 S. Ct. 2527, 2542 (2009).
221. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
222. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Address to the Text and Teaching Symposium,
Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRIFEN
CONSTITUTION 11, 17 (1986).
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To argue that the increased stress on state prosecutions could be
alleviated, the petitioners in Briscoe asserted that "states are free to
hire more lab technicians. They are a very small part of the criminal
justice system, and would remain so even if their numbers were
massively increased."223 In 2010, with all that has recently transpired
in the domestic economy,224 this is a ridiculous attempt to rationalize
the new direction of the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
Suggesting that the burdens that will be imposed on the states are
curable by states hiring more analysts, whose job descriptions will
typically consist of testifying to satisfy Melendez-Diaz objections,
both puts the cart before the horse and is completely detached from
fiscal reality.
Although the Court declined the opportunity to use Briscoe to
shape the method by which states enact notice-and-demand statutes,
another suitable case will come about in due time. Then, through
careful determination of acceptable statutory and judicial approaches
to temper Melendez-Diaz's new burden, the Court may at once
promote the fundamental purpose of the Confrontation Clause and
allow the states to prosecute criminal cases efficiently and fairly.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Confrontation Clause is doubtless an essential component of
our criminal justice system and, like many constitutional provisions,
it has been subject to differing interpretations over the course of
American history.225 However, when a contemporary interpretation of
a somewhat enigmatic constitutional clause implies novel and serious
complications on a judicial system that has grown to rely on certain
efficient and trustworthy practices such as forensic lab analysis over
the years, then perhaps we should step back and consider whether
strict adherence to a school of constitutional philosophy at the
223. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 159, at 34.
224. ANDREW SUM ET AL., THE ECONOMIC RECESSION OF 2007-2009: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DURATION AND THE SEVERITY OF ITS LABOR MARKET IMPACTS 1 (2009),
available at http://www.clms.neu.edu/publication/documents/EconomicRecession of 2007
2009.pdf ( "The current national economic recession that officially began in December 2007 has
been taking a severe toll on U.S. labor markets and workers in recent months, with steep drops in
nonfarm payroll employment, even larger reductions in the number of employed working age
adults (16 and older), and rapidly rising unemployment and underemployment problems.").
225. See generally, Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean
What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977) (setting forth an account of
constitutional change).
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expense of efficient criminal prosecutions is worth it.226 It is largely a
normative question involving the predominance of judicial
philosophy versus practicality, which this Note suggests should be
answered with a preference for pragmatism.
In state courts throughout America, trial judges are currently
facing-and will likely continue to face-uncertainty regarding the
propriety of state statutes and procedures used to offset the new
burdens imposed by Melendez-Diaz.22 7 Only by providing clear,
uniform guidance to these courts, will the consistent effect of the
originalists' Confrontation Clause be felt evenly throughout the
states. At present, minimal guidance exists as to what types of
notice-and-demand statutes and other means of limiting Melendez-
Diaz states may use, and thus the states seem to be left somewhat
uninhibited to tailor their approaches as they respectively see fit.228
Through practices such as enacting carefully tailored notice-and-
demand statutes, allowing surrogate and video-conferencing
testimony, and shrewdly interpreting the ambiguous language of
prior opinions, states will rightly maintain the ability to prosecute
cold and ordinary criminal cases as they see fit, despite the somewhat
clumsy ruling handed down in Melendez-Diaz.
226. Cf Alan Brownstein, The Reasons Why Originalism Provides a Weak Foundation for
Interpreting Constitutional Provisions Relating to Religion, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO
196, 200 (explaining that it is much easier to determine the original understanding of a
constitutional provision designed to serve one primary purpose than it is to determine the original
understanding of a provision that weaved its way through a maze of conflicting and overlapping
goals and values).
227. Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia filed an amicus brief in Briscoe v.
Virginia urging the Court to overrule or limit Melendez-Diaz's holding. Brief of the States of
Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming,
and the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Briscoe v. Virginia, 130
S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (No. 07-11191), 2009 WL 3652660.
228. The individuality among states' approaches with respect to notice-and-demand statutes
seems to be constitutionally acceptable, provided the approaches comport with due process.
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